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Abstract 
Volatile fuel prices affect both the cost and price of electricity in a liberalized 
market.  Generators with the price-setting technology will face less risk to their 
profit margins than those with costs that are not correlated with price, even if 
those costs are not volatile.  Emissions permit prices may respond to relative 
fuel prices, further increasing volatility.  This paper simulates the impact of this 
on generators’ profits, comparing an emissions trading scheme and a carbon tax 
against predictions for the UK in 2020.  The carbon tax reduces the volatility 
faced by nuclear generators, but raises that faced by fossil fuel stations.  Optimal 
portfolios would contain a higher proportion of nuclear plant if a carbon tax was 
adopted. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes work by raising the cost of 
producing electricity from fossil fuels.  The more polluting the technology, the 
more its variable cost increases.  This should provide an incentive to shift 
generation towards low-carbon technologies.  We know that taxes and permit 
schemes should have equivalent results in a world of certainty, but that they 
perform differently in an uncertain world.  This paper considers their different 
impact on the profit risk faced by electricity generators with a choice of 
technologies. 
The standard analysis of investment choices in electricity uses a cost-
minimizing approach.  Investors do not choose to build new power stations 
solely on the basis of their expected costs, however.  Companies wish to make 
profits, and to avoid excessive risks.  Roques et al. (2006a) show that a 
probabilistic analysis is needed to give the full picture of the expected return on 
an investment, and its distribution.  One particular issue discussed by Roques et 
al. (2006b) is that if the cost of gas and carbon are correlated with the price of 
electricity, the profit margin of a gas-fired generator can be less risky than either 
its costs or its revenues, considered in isolation.  The profit margin of a nuclear 
generator may be much more risky than that of the gas-fired station, since its 
costs will not be as correlated with the price of electricity.   
This paper asks how the choice between a carbon tax and an emissions 
permit scheme (based on auctions) affects the risk of investing in gas-fired or in 
nuclear generation.  With a carbon tax, the variable cost of gas-fired generation 
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is raised by a fixed amount, which will normally feed through into electricity 
prices.  With carbon permits, the price of emissions depends upon market 
conditions.  In the specific case of the electricity industry, the key factor is the 
relationship between coal and gas prices.  Taking a slightly Euro- and 
electricity-centric view, the price of carbon will be set so that the electricity 
industry within the EU reduces its emissions to the level that is needed in order 
that the demand for emissions permits equals the supply.  Imagine that the main 
choice in the short run is between running coal- and gas-fired plants,1 and that 
fuel prices are such that most coal-fired stations would be cheaper than gas-
fired, in the absence of the ETS.  In this case, this implies that the price of 
carbon has to rise until enough coal-fired output has been displaced by gas 
generation.  The price of carbon is then at the level which equalizes the running 
cost of some gas-fired and coal-fired stations (Newbery, 2006).  A rise in the 
price of gas will tend to raise the price of permits.  The higher gas price thus has 
both a direct effect on the price of electricity, and an indirect effect via the cost 
of emissions. 
  The aim of this paper is to discover whether this magnified 
relationship between gas and power prices has a significant impact on the 
relative risk of different kinds of generator, compared to the alternative of a 
carbon tax that was not linked to the level of fuel prices.  The paper follows the 
same basic approach as the papers already cited, but uses a more detailed model 
of the relationship between input prices and the wholesale price of electricity, 
that of Evans and Green (2005).  This allows us to calculate the expected 
profitability of each type of power station, taking into account the way that its 
operating pattern will depend upon its variable cost relative to other stations.   
The paper finds that choosing a carbon tax instead of carbon trading 
would raise the standard deviation of gas-fired generators’ annual profits by 
nearly 40%, would double the standard deviation of coal-fired profits, and 
would reduce the standard deviation of nuclear profits by almost 40%.  With 
emissions trading, the price of carbon varies to offset movements in relative coal 
and gas prices, reducing the risks faced by fossil-fuelled generators.  A switch to 
a carbon tax removes this insurance.  Since carbon prices are correlated with the 
gas prices that typically set the price of power, emissions trading makes the 
electricity price more volatile than a carbon tax would, and hence raises the 
volatility of nuclear stations’ profits, since their costs are assumed to be fixed. 
These changes raise the proportion of nuclear plant in the portfolios 
that optimize a generator’s risk and return.  While the impact depends on the 
level of risk aversion, adopting a carbon tax could raise the optimal proportion 
of nuclear plant from none to 16%.  Most of the rest of the portfolios consists of 
gas-fired plant, although at high levels of risk aversion, some of this is replaced 
by coal generation.  The paper also shows that hedging the output price of 
nuclear stations with long-term sales contracts would allow a much higher 
proportion of nuclear plant – up to 54% with carbon trading, and 64% with a 
carbon tax.  While the focus of this paper is on nuclear plant, renewable 
generators with fixed costs face similar issues. 
The next section briefly discusses the background to the Emissions 
Trading Scheme and the economics of a liberalized electricity industry.  Section 
3 outlines the supply function model used to determine the relationships 
between fuel and carbon prices and generator profits.  Section 4 presents the 
data used, drawn from the DTI Energy Review (2006) and Supergen FutureNET 
scenarios (Elders et al., 2008).  Section 5 presents the results for single plants, 
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and section 6 discusses optimal portfolios containing a mix of plants.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2. THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY AND THE EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME  
 
Traditionally, the electricity industry has largely been vertically 
integrated.  Large companies that combined generation and transmission might 
sell power to smaller distribution utilities, but this was usually done via 
contracts or tariffs, rather than with any kind of market mechanism.  Following 
Chile, England and Wales, and Norway, many countries have now adopted 
wholesale markets for electricity, with competition between generators.  While 
the details vary across countries, the key elements are that generation has been 
split from transmission, that entry into generation is largely deregulated, and that 
generators compete to sell their output, through a centralized market, bilateral 
contracts, or both. 
 This has changed the way in which companies need to think about 
investment.  Traditionally, investment plans were made with the objective of 
minimizing the expected cost of meeting the forecast level of demand.  There 
could be a trade-off between capital costs and fuel costs – plant that was 
expected to run for most of the time could incur high capital costs in return for 
lower fuel costs (the standard example being nuclear power) while still being 
competitive against plant with lower capital costs but high fuel costs.  For plant 
that was not expected to run for much of the time, it would not be worth 
incurring the high capital costs.  Most newly-built plant was expected to run 
nearly continuously on base load, however, and so valid cost comparisons could 
be made on the basis of the expected cost per kWh generated at a standardized, 
high, load factor.  The option with the lowest expected levelized cost would 
normally be the front-runner for investment.  The classical investment appraisal 
appeared to take little notice of risk or uncertainty. 
 In a market-based system, companies invest to earn profits.  Their first 
criterion will not be to minimize the expected cost of meeting demand, but to 
maximize the expected difference between their costs and their revenues.  In a 
fully competitive market, in which the company was not able to influence the 
prices a plant received, this would come down to minimizing its expected cost, 
as with the pre-liberalization approach.  This equivalence between the outcome 
of a perfect competitive market and a perfect social planner is, after all, one of 
the arguments for liberalization. 
 Companies in the market-based system have a second criterion beside 
the level of profits, however.  Typically, they wish to avoid taking on excessive 
risk.  One approach for this is to sign long-term contracts for fuel inputs and 
electricity sales at the start of construction, locking in the plant’s selling margin.  
This depends on finding counter-parties willing to take on the risk of these 
contracts.  In Finland, a group of energy-intensive industrial customers has 
contracted to take the output from a new-build nuclear plant, which should give 
them stable power costs throughout their own long-lived investment cycle.  A 
company selling to captive customers would also be a natural counter-party for 
the electricity contract, but liberalization may have deterred electricity retailers 
who might lose their customers from taking on such commitments (Newbery, 
2002).  In the absence of a contract to lock in the risk, companies will have to 
trade off risk and expected profit when deciding on investments. 
 In a liberalized market, the wholesale price of power should be related 
to its marginal cost.  The more competitive the market, the closer prices should 
be to marginal cost.  At times of peak demand, this marginal cost should be 
understood to include the cost of rationing demand if this is necessary to match 
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it with the available capacity.  At other times, marginal cost consists of fuel and 
variable operations and maintenance costs, with fuel costs dominating.   
 The marginal cost of the system naturally depends upon which plants 
are operating, since the most expensive of these will determine the system’s 
marginal cost.  The approach used in the traditional system was essentially to 
stack the plants in a merit order of increasing marginal cost, and to call on the 
lowest-cost plants first.2  Nuclear plants were expected to run on base load, 
while high (marginal-) cost open cycle gas turbines would only operate at times 
of high demand.  These stations suffered from both a low thermal efficiency and 
a fuel that was usually expensive.  Other stations might trade off a higher fuel 
price against a greater thermal efficiency – this was the situation with Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbines in the UK for much of the 1990s, which paid more per kWh 
of fuel than coal-fired plants did, but needed less fuel per kWh generated, giving 
them a lower marginal cost.  When fuel costs change, however, the merit order 
will change. 
 In the European Union, a new component has recently been added to 
generators’ marginal costs, with the introduction of the Emissions Trading 
Scheme.  Adopted in response to the Kyoto Treaty on greenhouse gas emissions, 
the ETS requires all large combustion plants in the EU to surrender an emissions 
permit for each tonne of carbon dioxide that they emit, or pay a penalty.  These 
permits are issued by Member States, following national allocation plans that 
have to be approved by the European Commission.  The intention is that the 
plans will be consistent with each country’s commitments under the Kyoto 
Treaty and the EU’s burden-sharing agreement, which provides for differential 
reductions relative to each country’s 1990 baseline, depending on its individual 
circumstances.  If “business as usual” would involve more emissions than are 
compatible with these commitments, then there will not be enough permits to go 
round.  Their price will rise, and this should signal a need for companies to 
change their behavior. 
 The first phase of the scheme runs from 2005 to 2007, with a second 
phase from 2008 to 2012, covering the Kyoto commitment period.  So far, 
permit prices do appear to be passed through into electricity prices. In 2005, 
prices in Germany and the Netherlands rose by between 60% and 117% of 
carbon costs (Sijm et al, 2006).  This is in line with the predictions of 
economists, but not perhaps of politicians who expected that if most permits 
were granted free of charge, keeping companies’ average costs unchanged, then 
they would not change their prices (Gabriel, 2006). 
 The free allocation can have important effects on companies’ 
investment behavior, however (Green, 2005).  If permits are given away to 
plants that continue to operate or are newly built, but not to those that close, this 
can be seen as a subsidy towards their fixed costs, coupled with a tax on their 
marginal costs.  The tax is passed through to prices, while the subsidy gives an 
incentive to keep more capacity open.  To the extent that peak prices depend on 
the margin of capacity, this effect can offset some of the scheme’s impact on 
marginal costs, limiting the overall effect on average prices in the long run.  The 
way in which permits are given away can also affect the choice of technology.  
If the allocation is linked to past emissions, or to the technology chosen by a 
new plant, then more polluting plants will tend to get a more valuable allocation 
of permits.  This more valuable allocation will tend to offset the plants’ need for 
                                                          
2 In practice, a more complicated optimisation is required to take account of constraints such as 
limits to the rate at which plants can change their output, and the cost of starting up a plant to meet a 
peak in demand, which tends to raise the true marginal cost at the peak well above the “steady state” 
variable cost of meeting that level of demand if it were to persist for a long time.  Similarly, it is 
expensive to restart a plant after switching it off when demand is low, and the benefit of avoiding 
this reduces the marginal cost at times of low demand.  These complications are not important for 
the purposes of this paper.  
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more permits, reducing the opportunity cost of investing in a dirty plant, or 
keeping a polluting plant open – as long as the allocation is conditional on the 
plant’s status.  A technology-neutral allocation (which should even include 
giving away permits to nuclear stations) would maximize the scheme’s impact 
on the choice of technology (Neuhoff et al. 2006). 
 If giving away carbon emissions permits to nuclear plants seems 
politically unattractive, an alternative would be to auction the permits.  Since the 
combination of free allocation and permit prices feeding through to power prices 
gives electricity generators a windfall profit, auctioning the permits would claw 
this profit back to governments.  The UK government has announced that it will 
auction 7% of its permits in phase II of the ETS – the rules for the scheme set an 
upper limit of 10% for this phase.  It remains to be seen whether this limit will 
be relaxed in future phases (and indeed, whether there will be any future 
phases). 
 In a world of certainty, auctioning permits starts to look very like an 
alternative method of dealing with externalities, a Pigovian tax.  If the price of 
the permit could be predicted, the same amount could be imposed as a tax, with 
very similar economic effects.  It is quite possible, however, that the costs of 
administering the tax would be lower than those of trading permits.  In an 
uncertain world, the two schemes will have different effects, as one fixes the 
quantity of emissions, while the other fixes the amount that companies are 
prepared to spend to avoid it.  Weitzman (1974) shows that if the marginal 
damage from pollution and the marginal cost of avoiding it are uncertain, the 
optimal economic choice between the two systems depends on the relative 
slopes of the functions relating marginal damage and cost to the level of 
pollution.  In the case of global warming, the marginal damage is believed to be 
quite insensitive to the level of emissions in any one year, implying that a tax 
would be a more suitable economic instrument.  Baldursson and von der Fehr 
(2004) show that risk-aversion on the part of producers will reduce the 
performance of a permit system, relative to that of a tax, when abatement costs 
are known.3  Zhao (2003), however, shows that the advantage of taxes over 
permits in encouraging investment decreases if investment costs are also risky, 
which is currently the (perceived) case for new nuclear stations.  Evans (2007) 
shows that the optimal instrument for dealing with one pollutant can depend on 
the instrument used for dealing with other pollutants.  He models measures to 
control emissions of sulfur and of mercury, but the analysis would also apply to 
controls on carbon and other pollutants.  
The politics of rent-seeking favor a permit system, however, as interest 
groups can argue for the free allocation of valuable permits, as has happened 
with the ETS.  Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), Burtraw et al. (2002) and 
Burtraw and Palmer (2007) discuss the level of free allocation that would be 
needed to maintain profit levels and asset values in the US electricity industry.  
Bovenberg et al. (2005) calculate the efficiency cost of these levels of free 
allocation, compared to the alternative of auctioning all the permits and using 
the revenue to cut distorting taxes, using a general equilibrium model. 
 What determines the value of permits?  The answer is supply and 
demand, or rather perceived supply and demand.  When the scheme started, data 
on carbon emissions in the EU was very incomplete, and the release of the first 
comprehensive data in May 2006 caused a significant fall in permit prices.  
Market participants realized that emissions had been lower, relative to the 
supply of permits, than they had believed, implying that the price needed to 
                                                          
3 They do not derive conditions under which a tax system or a permit system would be better, but 
state that “given a certain difference in efficiency between taxes and quotas … the introduction of 
uncertainty and risk aversion will, in general, tilt the balance in direction of regulation by taxes” 
(Baldursson and von der Fehr, 2004, p. 703). 
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align the two was also lower.  It is unlikely that there will be significant 
investment effects during phase I of the ETS, given the short timescales 
involved, and balancing emissions with the supply of permits depends upon 
operating decisions.  If the price of electricity rises, demand for it should fall, 
reducing emissions, but the key operating decision will be between gas- and 
coal-fired power stations.  Gas contains carbon and hydrogen, while almost all 
the energy content of coal comes from carbon, implying that burning coal will 
produce more CO2 per unit of energy than burning gas.  Furthermore, many gas-
fired stations in Europe are combined cycle gas turbines with higher thermal 
efficiencies (lower heat rates) than coal-fired plants.  This implies that switching 
from coal-fired to gas-fired stations will typically reduce emissions.  If the price 
of gas is low, gas-fired plant will naturally be above coal plants in the merit 
order, and emissions will be low.  If the price of gas is high, however, coal will 
be favored.  If this is incompatible with the number of permits available, then 
the price of permits should rise in order to reduce coal’s cost advantage and give 
generators an incentive to burn more gas.  We would then expect the price of 
permits to be positively correlated with the price of gas, and negatively 
correlated with that of coal. 
 These correlations, and the correlations between fuel and electricity 
prices, are at the heart of what follows.  If generators are worried about profit 
risks, then they will have an incentive to choose technologies with costs that are 
correlated to power prices.  The costs of gas-fired stations have this property, 
while those of nuclear stations do not.  If carbon prices are also correlated with 
gas prices, then this will increase the volatility of both power prices and gas-
fired generators’ costs, while they remain correlated.  Nuclear stations are not 
exposed to carbon prices and will be relatively more risky.  The next sections of 
the paper set out the model that is used to test this theory. 
 
  
3. A SUPPLY FUNCTION MODEL 
 
This paper uses a supply function model to predict generators’ profits, 
given input costs and the level of demand.  Klemperer and Meyer (1989) 
introduced the supply function equilibrium, while Green and Newbery (1992) 
applied it to the British electricity market.  As argued in that paper, the supply 
function equilibrium is a close approximation to the workings of the Pool, in 
which companies effectively had to submit offers of prices and quantities (from 
each of their many power stations) that would hold throughout the following 
day.4  These offers can be represented by a supply function, and the equilibrium 
price and output in each period are given by the intersection of the aggregated 
supply function with the market demand curve.  Demand varies over time, 
which is mathematically equivalent to the stochastic variation considered by 
Klemperer and Meyer.  
 Formally, demand is denoted by D(p,t).  Assume that dD/dp < 0, and that 
d2D/dp2  ≤ 0.  There are n generators, which compete by submitting supply 
functions (q (p): R  → R , i = 1...n) which state the amount they would be willing to 
produce (q ) at any price (p).  These functions must be non-decreasing in p - the 
Pool's rules ensure this by ranking plants in order of increasing bids.  The price at 
each time is determined by a market-clearing condition.  The total output supplied 
at the market-clearing price must just equal the demand with that price at that 
time:5  
                                                          
4 Companies could vary their available capacity each half-hour, but very rarely did so in a strategic 
manner (as opposed to not bothering to staff a peaking plant which would not run overnight, for 
example). 
     5   For completeness, we assume that if there is no price which solves this condition, the price will 
be zero. 
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An equilibrium consists of a set of supply functions, one for each firm, such that 
each firm is maximizing its profits, given the supply functions of the other firms, at 
every time.  We can write each firm's profits πi (revenues, less the cost (C (q )) of 
production) at each time as a function of price, assuming that it produces the 
residual demand (that is, total demand less the other firms' supply at that price) in 
order to meet the market-clearing condition: 
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This profit function can be differentiated with respect to price:  
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Setting this derivative to zero gives the profit-maximizing price level at a particular 
time, and it also gives the profit-maximizing output (i.e., the residual demand) at 
that price level.  Assume that ∂2D/∂p∂t = 0, and then this price cannot be optimal 
for a different level of demand.  The (price, quantity) pair will then form a point on 
the profit-maximizing supply function.  We can manipulate the first-order condition 
to give a differential equation for the firm’s supply function:   
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A supply function equilibrium consists of a set of solutions to equation (4), one for 
each firm, such that the resulting functions are sloping upwards for every price that 
might be obtained from the intersection of a demand curve and the aggregate 
supply function.  If the firms are symmetric, there is a wide range of potential 
supply functions, although it narrows as the variation in demand increases.   
 Evans and Green (2005) were able to simulate electricity prices from 
April 1997 to March 2005, using a symmetric approximation of the industry supply 
function.  They modeled the industry as if it contained n  symmetric strategic 
generators, together with a competitive fringe.  In each month,  was the inverse 
of the Herfindahl index, calculated using the capacity of the strategic generators.  
This gives a straightforward differential equation: 
ˆ
nˆ
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Since only the industry supply function is required to predict prices and (overall) 
operating patterns, it is not necessary for  to be an integer.  Following Evans and 
Green, this paper uses the highest-priced supply function that includes all of the 
firms’ capacity – it starts from the price that the firms would charge if they were 
selling their full capacity in a Cournot equilibrium.  This industry supply function is 
nˆ
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then combined with the supply curve of nuclear stations bidding at their near-zero 
marginal cost to give an overall supply curve, shown in figure 1.6  The predicted 
equilibrium price for a given period is then given by the intersection of this supply 
curve with the demand curve for that period.  We can also find the marginal cost at 
this point, and hence infer which stations are generating.7  This implicitly assumes 
that the industry truly is symmetric, since a smaller generator will produce more, 
relative to its capacity, than a larger one, and so marginal costs would not be 
equalized across asymmetric generators.  For the purposes of this paper, this 
simplification is unlikely to create important effects.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. CALIBRATION 
 
Much of the data for this paper comes from the UK government’s 
recently-published Energy Review (DTI, 2006, Annex B).  Demand in 2020 is 
expected to be around 400 TWh in the DTI’s central case.  The pattern of 
demand within the year is assumed to be the same as in 2003-5, scaled up by 
28% to give the desired total.    
The review includes information on the costs of a range of generating 
technologies, and predictions of fossil fuel prices, expressed as central, high and 
low cases. The variable cost of a power station is equal to the price of its fuel 
and carbon (permit or tax) per kWh of fuel, divided by its thermal efficiency, 
plus its variable operations and maintenance costs.  The review also gives 
information on fixed operations and maintenance costs, capital costs (per kW) 
and the expected life of the plants.  The capital costs were converted to annual 
figures with a discount rate of 10%, the rate used by the DTI.8  Where the DTI 
gives two figures, the mid-point is used.  All money values are in 2006 pounds. 
The three main technologies considered in the industry supply function 
are coal-fired stations, combined cycle gas turbines, and nuclear stations.  A 
small amount of oil-fired plant, and prototype stations with carbon capture and 
storage, was also included in the model.  These higher-cost plants have the 
effect of raising the industry’s marginal cost at the far end of its supply function, 
and hence raising the price received by all the other plants.  The amounts of 
coal, gas, and nuclear plants were taken from one of the Supergen FutureNET 
scenarios for 2020 (Elders et al., 2008), “supportive regulation”.  This scenario 
has a slightly greater demand for electricity than the DTI’s base case, however, 
and so this paper assumes slightly less CCGT capacity than the scenario.  We 
assume a Herfindahl index of 1/6, equivalent to six equal-sized firms, when 
deriving the supply function for the industry’s non-nuclear capacity.  Nuclear 
stations are assumed to run on base load and not to affect the market price. 
The prices of gas, coal, and oil are stochastic, with means equal to the 
DTI’s central predictions for 2020.  All three have lognormal distributions.  The 
price of oil is taken to be the underlying random variable, while the prices of gas 
and coal are linked to it.  Each price is given in pounds per MWh: 
                                                          
6 Nuclear stations have high fixed costs, low variable costs, and limited flexibility in operation and 
will always try to run at full capacity, rather than competing with the more flexible fossil-fuelled 
stations.  
7 With continuous marginal costs, there is a specific marginal point on the cost function, and all 
capacity with marginal costs below this level would be operating.  This paper uses a step function, 
and so it will typically be the case that not all of the marginal tranche of capacity will be operating – 
we assume that each plant in the tranche has the same chance of running.  When calculating the 
variability of profits, however, we treat a 50% chance of running as a deterministic period of 
operation at 50% of capacity.  
8 A much lower rate, of 2.2%, was used to discount the costs of nuclear decommissioning and waste 
reprocessing.   
    8 
       
)1,0(;)4875.2)3.07.0(36.0exp(
)1,0(;)35.1)5.05.0(38.0exp(
)1,0(;)7175.233.0exp(
Np
Np
Np
gasgasoilgas
coalcoaloilcoal
oiloiloil
∈++=
∈++=
∈+=
ηηη
ηηη
ηη
        (6) 
 
The distributions are calibrated so that each fuel price has a mean equal to the 
DTI’s Central Case (Favoring Coal) for 2020.  The means plus or minus two 
standard deviations are approximately equal to the DTI’s High and Low cases 
for each fuel.  (The DTI’s figures are not quite consistent with a lognormal 
distribution, and so this match cannot be exact).  Table 1 shows the mean and 
standard deviations for each fuel, together with their correlation coefficients.  
The bottom part of the table gives the correlations between real annual average 
fuel prices using data from the BP digest of energy statistics for Brent crude, and 
coal and oil delivered to North-West Europe.  This assumes that as the UK 
imports an increasing proportion of its gas, its prices will converge on those in 
North-West Europe.  Our main simulations match the higher correlations 
between fuel prices seen in the more recent past, but a second set, based on the 
lower correlations, give very similar results in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms.   
 
Table 1: Fuel prices (£/MWh) 
Oil Gas Coal  
Mean 15.99 12.48 3.99 
Standard Deviation 5.40 3.39 1.09 
Oil 0.89 0.70 Correlation with 
Gas  0.63 
Oil 0.89 0.70 1996 to 2005 
Gas  0.62 
Oil 0.86 0.50 
Correlation in 
BP world 
energy tables 1987 to 2005 
Gas  0.48 
 
In the model runs for the ETS, the price of carbon is set to vary randomly 
around the level that would equalize the cost of generation from a coal-fired and 
a gas-fired station.  As discussed above, this is based on the view that switching 
between coal and gas will be necessary to keep emissions down to the level 
required by the ETS, and that the price of carbon will vary around the level that 
would keep plants of both types on the margin.  If a coal-fired station with a 
thermal efficiency of 35% and a gas-fired station with a thermal efficiency of 
53% have equal costs, this implies: 
 
53.0
19635.0
35.0
3395.0 gascarcoalcar pppp +=+   (7) 
 
where pcar is the price of permits per tonne of carbon dioxide, pcoal is the price of 
coal per MWh, and pgas is the price of gas per MWh.  The coefficients on the 
carbon prices are the amounts of carbon dioxide per MWh of fuel, while the 
denominators are the thermal efficiencies.  A random normal variable was then 
added, to reflect uncertainties over how far generators would have to switch 
between coal and gas to meet the emissions limit, for example.  This gives us an 
equation for the price per tonne of carbon dioxide: 
 
pcar = 3.15 pgas – 4.77 pcoal + N(0,2)   (8) 
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The particular coefficients of this equation, but not its linear form, depend on the 
thermal efficiencies of the plants that are marginal in terms of fuel switching to 
meet the emissions limit. This price was not, of course, allowed to become 
negative.  This gave a mean carbon price of £20.18 per tonne, and this was the 
level imposed as a carbon tax.  This is close to the level (£17/tonne) that the DTI 
used in its Central case in the Energy Review.  For a sensitivity analysis, a 
carbon price with the same mean but half the link to fuel prices was also used: 
 
pcar = 10.11  + 1.57 pgas – 2.38 pcoal + N(0,1)  (9) 
 
The paper so far has not discussed the role of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) in the ETS.  Instead of reducing their own emissions or 
buying ETS permits, companies can pay for emissions reduction measures in 
developing countries, and surrender the certified emissions reduction units 
obtained for these.  By December 2006, 435 schemes expected to save 106 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide (equivalent) a year had been registered, with 
roughly twice as many in the pipeline and a predicted saving of 1.5 billion 
tonnes by 2012.  If the CDM provides a sufficiently elastic supply of emissions 
reductions at a sufficiently low cost, then this will cap the price of ETS permits.  
If gas is cheap and coal expensive, then fuel switching will be the preferred 
option and will keep the price of permits low.  If the price of gas rises, CDM 
schemes could be used instead.  The combination would resemble a hybrid tax-
permit scheme which would behave like a trading scheme when fuel setting 
implied a low permit price, and a tax when the (assumed) elastic supply of CDM 
credits provided a lower-cost option.   
The techniques used in this paper could easily be applied to analyze 
such a hybrid scheme.  The aim of this paper is to show the differences between 
a tax and a trading scheme, and for this, it is best to work with “pure” versions.  
If the supply of CDM credits is not sufficiently elastic, they will act to shift the 
amount of fuel switching (or other measures) required in Europe, but will not be 
able to act as a price cap.  For both these reasons, CDM credits are not explicitly 
included in the model of this paper.  
 For each scenario run, one industry-level supply curve was generated 
for winter and one for summer.  For winter, 90% of plant was assumed to be 
available, with 80% availability in summer.  Since the price of gas is seasonal, 
but the degree of variation varies from year to year, the price of gas in winter 
was raised above the annual average obtained earlier by a random amount, 
uniformly distributed between zero and 12% (in line with past patterns).  The 
summer price was reduced by the same amount, preserving the annual (time-
weighted) average.  Twenty-six demand curves for representative half-hours 
were used in each season, based on wholesale market price-quantity pairs from 
2003-5 (with the quantity demanded scaled up to 2020 levels as described 
above), taking the lowest demand level from April to September, the 4th 
percentile, 8th percentile and so on.  Renewable generation was subtracted from 
the gross demand to give the net demand that must be met by large stations.  
This output is stochastic, with a mean load factor of 33%, and a standard 
deviation (for nationwide output) of 5%.  Once again, stations had an 
availability of 90% in winter and 80% in summer, giving slightly higher 
generation levels in the winter months. 
The intersections of the net demand curves and the industry supply 
curve were found, and the equilibrium prices calculated.  This allowed us to 
predict the output from each type of plant in each of the representative half-
hours, and the margin between their revenues and variable costs.  An individual 
station would only earn this margin if it was actually available, however, with a 
probability of 0.9 or 0.8 (depending on the season).  If not available, it would 
earn no margin in that half-hour.  The station’s expected profits over the year 
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were equal to the 52 margin figures (equally weighted), scaled up for the total 
number of half-hours in the year, less its fixed costs. 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
The model was simulated 50,000 times for carbon trading, and 50,000 
times for a carbon tax.    The key results are shown in table 2, and figures 2 and 
3.  In figure 2, it is clear that with carbon trading, gas-fired stations have the 
least variable profits, followed by coal-fired stations, while the profits of a 
nuclear station are dispersed over a wide range that includes a nearly one in four 
chance of making an annual loss.  Comparing this with figure 3, when a carbon 
tax is imposed instead, the profits of coal and gas-fired plants become more 
variable, and those of nuclear plants less variable.  Nuclear profits are still 
clearly more dispersed than those of gas-fired stations, and table 2 confirms that 
they have a greater standard deviation than those of coal-fired plants. 
 
FIGURES 2 and 3 about here 
 
Table 2: The impact of carbon policy  
 Profits 
(£ per kW-year) 
Price  
(Annual 
average) 
Carbon trading CCGT Coal Nuclear £/MWh 
    Mean 36.76 9.25 32.89 42.22 
    Standard deviation 8.41 13.88 64.40 8.58 
Carbon tax     
    Mean 38.35 10.76 34.54 42.43 
    Standard deviation 11.55 29.73 38.25 5.04 
 
In this model, new gas-fired stations are slightly more profitable on average than 
nuclear stations, which are both at least three times as profitable as new 
pulverized fuel coal plants (without carbon capture).  Compared to the variation 
between plant types, carbon policy has little impact on mean profits, which is by 
design, since the carbon tax is imposed at the mean level of the carbon price in 
the trading simulations.  There is a slight increase in the average electricity 
price, and in mean profits, with a carbon tax.  The reason for this increase, 
which is neither inevitable nor central to the results in this paper, is explained in 
the appendix.  The observed increase in the average price, of about £0.2/MWh, 
would imply an extra profit of £1.50/kW for a plant that ran 7,500 hours a year 
with unchanged costs.  
In Finland, a nuclear station is being built with the support of long-term 
contracts with a group of industrial customers, companies that want to have a 
stable electricity price over the (very) long term.  It is straightforward to assess 
the impact of similar contracts on the economics of our power plants.9  The 
contract used in this paper is a base-load forward contract that delivers the same 
amount of power in each half-hour of the year, at a price equal to the time-
weighted average price across all the runs for a given carbon policy.  This means 
that the generators’ expected profits are not affected if some of their output is 
sold at this fixed price, rather than at the variable market price, but the 
variability of their profits will be affected.   
A nuclear generator can indeed reduce its risks by a significant amount 
if it covers much of its output with contracts.  With carbon trading, the 
generator’s profits have a standard deviation of about £64/kW-year, but this falls 
                                                          
9 I would like to thank Matthew Leach for suggesting this addition to the paper. 
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to a little £7/kW-year if the generator signs a contract that covers its expected 
output.  This would be a contract for 0.85 kW of output per kW of capacity, 
given that the station expects to be unavailable for 10% of the time in winter and 
20% of the time in summer.  With a carbon tax, signing the same contract 
reduces the standard deviation of profits to a little under £7/kW-year. 
A gas-fired generator does not reduce its risks by signing a contract to 
sell its output at a fixed price – in fact, selling 0.85 kW of output in advance 
raises the standard deviation of its profits from £8/kW-year to £64/kW-year with 
carbon trading, and from £12/kW-year to £44/kW-year with a carbon tax.  The 
problem is the reverse of that faced by the nuclear generator, since the contract 
fixes the gas-fired station’s revenues while leaving its costs variable.  If the 
station could combine fixed-price contracts for gas purchases and for electricity 
sales, then its risks would fall. 
 
 
6. PORTFOLIO EFFECTS 
  
Looking at individual stations, investing in CCGT plant is clearly the 
most attractive option, with higher predicted profits and a lower standard 
deviation, whether carbon is traded or taxed.  Coal-fired plants appear least 
profitable under either system, while the returns to nuclear plant have the 
highest standard deviation.  Long-run contracts could reduce the variability of 
nuclear plants’ profits, but will not increase them.   
In practice, however, most investment decisions in the electricity 
industry are made by companies that own a portfolio of plant, and we must 
consider portfolio effects.  Awerbuch (2000) has applied portfolio theory from 
the finance literature to show that including renewable generators in a portfolio 
of plant can improve the trade-off between expected generating cost and its 
variability.  The portfolio can improve its balance between return and risk by 
adding an extra asset, even if that asset is inferior on both counts to the rest of 
the portfolio, considered in isolation, as long as the correlation between the asset 
returns is not too high.  Twomey (2005) and Roques et al. (2007) show how this 
theory can be applied to different portfolios of thermal plant.     
Figure 4 shows the frontiers of risk and return that can be achieved by 
constructing a range of optimal portfolios for each policy.10  At the top right 
hand end of the frontier, the highest return (expected profit per kW) comes from 
a portfolio of gas-fired plant alone, but this also has the highest risk, measured in 
terms of the standard deviation.  Adding nuclear stations, contracts, and coal-
fired plants allows a company to construct a portfolio with a lower level of risk, 
although it will have to sacrifice some expected return to do so.  Note that the 
proportion of nuclear plant in the low-risk portfolios is well above the 
proportion in the system as a whole.  This might be achievable for a single 
company, but if every major company in the industry tried to construct a similar 
portfolio, the industry’s plant mix would change.  We could run the simulations 
again for the new plant mix, check whether the optimal portfolio had changed, 
and eventually reach a fully consistent outcome. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                          
10 Each portfolio took a weighted average of the profits of three individual plants and of a long-term 
contract, and the mean and standard deviation of each portfolio’s profits were recorded.  The optimal 
portfolios were found by a grid search, using steps of 2 percentage points.  The variability of 
portfolios with a high proportion of a single plant type is slightly over-estimated, since they are 
based on a single unit with stochastic availability.  In reality, such a portfolio would include more 
than one plant, with uncorrelated availability and slightly less variable profits. 
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We do not need to know the generators’ preferences between risk and 
return in order to specify the frontier of optimal portfolios, for it is simply the 
outer envelope of the many points which could have been plotted in figure 4 – 
interior points were in fact omitted for clarity.  To assess which portfolio a 
generator might choose, however, we need to know their trade-off between risk 
and return.  A standard model of this trade-off uses a mean-variance utility 
function, given by: 
 
U = πe – ½ λ var(π)             (10) 
 
where U is the generator’s utility, πe is the expected profit (per kW-year), var(π) 
is the variance of profits per kW-year, and λ is the coefficient of risk aversion.  
It is possible to use Grinold’s (1996) “grapes from wine” technique to infer the 
value of λ from stock market data on ex-post returns and their variability. UK 
investors would appear to have a value of λ equal to 2.2 divided by their wealth, 
where wealth needs to be measured relative to the units in this model (here, kW 
of capacity) (Green, 2004).  With profits of around £50/kW-year from most of 
the potentially optimal portfolios, and a discount rate of 10%, this is likely to 
produce a very low value for λ of less than 0.005.  At this level of risk aversion, 
an all-gas portfolio would be optimal, but we will show the way in which the 
optimal portfolio changes in response to rising risk aversion over a much greater 
range of values for λ.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the optimal portfolios obtained for different 
degrees of risk aversion under the two policies, assuming that the companies are 
unable to sell long-term contracts to hedge the risks faced by nuclear plant.  
With carbon trading, the optimal proportion of nuclear plant is tiny, and this is 
edged out by coal plant for high degrees of risk aversion.  With a carbon tax, 
there is a noticeable increase in the optimal proportion of nuclear plant, to nearly 
20%, although once again this is replaced by coal-fired stations for high degrees 
of risk aversion.  Note that the horizontal scale of these diagrams is not linear, 
for more bars are given for low degrees of risk aversion than for the higher 
levels.  
 
FIGURES 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show the impact of allowing the generators to sign 
long-term sales contracts at the expected wholesale price.  There is a dramatic 
increase in the optimal proportion of nuclear plant, most of which is covered by 
contracts.  Once again, a carbon tax is associated with a higher level of nuclear 
plant for most levels of risk aversion.  Coal plants form part of the portfolio for 
the highest levels of risk aversion, but at a lower proportion than if contracts are 
not used.  
 
FIGURES 7 and 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has used simulation methods to predict the mean and 
variance of the profits earned by different types of generators in a liberalized 
electricity market with different types of emissions policy.  Using numbers 
appropriate for the UK in 2020, gas-fired stations appear to be both most 
profitable and to have the lowest variance of profits.  This is due to the high 
correlation between their marginal costs and the price of electricity.  It is likely 
to be self-reinforcing, since these characteristics make gas-fired stations more 
attractive to investors, and an increase in the proportion of gas-fired generation 
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strengthens the link between the cost of gas-fired stations and the price of 
power. 
Nuclear power stations have costs that are much less volatile than those 
of gas-fired stations, but their profits are more volatile.  This is because their 
costs are not correlated with their revenues, if these depend on short-term 
electricity prices linked to the price of gas.  With the DTI cost estimates used in 
this paper, nuclear stations are also less profitable than gas-fired stations, though 
more profitable than coal-fired.  If companies are sufficiently risk-averse, 
including nuclear power stations in a portfolio of plant could be worthwhile, 
given the negative correlation between nuclear and CCGT profits.  The level of 
risk aversion required for this diversification argument to be effective, however, 
could be higher than that supported by estimates drawn from the UK stock 
market.  A higher carbon tax, or more restrictive emissions trading scheme, 
could raise the profits of nuclear power, but will not reduce their volatility while 
wholesale prices are linked to the cost of gas.  Long-term electricity sales 
contracts would be needed if the hedge that nuclear generation provides for the 
system’s costs is to become a hedge for company profits.   
 Finally, it is worth pointing out that a carbon tax only reduces the 
volatility of nuclear profits if generators can be sure that, once set, it will remain 
constant or move along a pre-announced path.  There may be significant 
political difficulties in adopting a carbon tax in the first place – the ETS was 
adopted after several years of attempting to impose a European carbon-energy 
tax.  Ensuring that a tax, if adopted, was not continually adjusted by politicians 
might be an even greater challenge.   
 
 
Appendix – the effect on average electricity prices 
In the simulations, a carbon tax produced a slightly higher average 
price than carbon trading, even though the tax was set at the average level of the 
carbon price obtained with trading.  This appendix provides intuition for this 
result, which is not inevitable. The increase in prices comes from the way in 
which the carbon policies affect the marginal cost curve.  By design, carbon 
trading will produce a relatively flat marginal cost curve over the industry’s 
fossil-fired plants, since the carbon price adjusts to bring the marginal costs of 
coal and gas-fired plant close together.  A carbon tax does not change when one 
type of plant has relatively lower fuel costs, and so the marginal cost curve will 
tend to be steeper.  The plants with lower costs, whichever they happen to be, 
will be at the bottom of the curve, and those with higher costs at the top.  This 
implies that prices will be less volatile within a day if there is carbon trading. 
The absolute position of the marginal cost curve, however, will be more 
volatile in response to changing fuel prices with a system of carbon trading than 
with a carbon tax.  When the gas price is low, a low carbon price will tend to 
keep marginal costs low, whereas the impact of a high gas price is magnified by 
that of a high carbon price.  This effect does not occur with a carbon tax.  The 
curves are shown, schematically, in figure 9.  The outer solid lines are assumed 
to be the extremes encountered with carbon trading, whereas the inner solid 
lines are the extremes produced by a carbon tax.  The dashed lines show the 
averages of these two types of marginal cost curve.  They cross, for the area 
under each of these lines must be equal – adding up every plant’s marginal cost 
over all 50,000 runs will give the same total, whether using carbon trading or a 
tax at the same average level.  The average of a given plant’s marginal cost does 
not depend on the choice of policy.   
 
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
    14 
The equilibrium prices obtained, however, depend upon where the 
marginal cost curves are intersected by demand curves.  If a demand curve runs 
to the right of the cost curves’ crossing point, it will produce a higher average 
price with a carbon tax than with carbon trading.  In these model runs, a 
majority of the demand curves used are for these higher demand levels, and so 
the average price across all demand curves and all simulations is slightly higher 
with a carbon tax than with carbon trading.  This is not a central feature of the 
paper, and it is not inevitable.  Had more of the demand curves been to the left 
of the crossing point, a carbon tax would have led to a slightly lower average 
price. 
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Figure 1: Industry supply function - DTI Base Case
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Figure 2: Profits with carbon emissions permits 
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Figure 3: Profits with a carbon tax 
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Figure 4: Return and risk from optimal portfolios 
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Figure 5: Optimal portfolios with emissions trading 
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Figure 6: Optimal portfolios with a carbon tax  
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Figure 7: Optimal portfolios with emissions trading and 
long-term contracts 
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Figure 8: Optimal portfolios with a carbon tax and long-
term contracts 
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Figure 9 – Why a carbon tax can affect average prices 
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